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Abstract
Detecting contagion during financial crises requires demarcation of crisis periods.
This paper presents a method for endogeneous dating of both the start and finish of
crises, coupled with the statistical detection of contagion effects. We couple smooth
transition functions with structural GARCH to identify both features of markets
in crisis, and provide conditions under which these effects will be identified. To
illustrate we apply the framework to US financial returns in REITS, S&P500 and
Treasury bonds indices over the period 2001 to 2010, and clearly identify four phases
consistent with a pre-crisis period to October 2007, two phases of crisis up to and
following late August 2008, and a post-crisis phase dating from June 2009. The evi-
dence strongly supports changes in the transmission mechanisms of shocks between
asset returns during the crisis, and particularly contagion from equity markets to
REITS. The post-crisis period has not returned to pre-crisis relationships.
JEL classification: G01; C51;
Key words: Contagion; Structural GARCH; Global Financial Crisis;
Detecting and measuring contagion effects during financial crises is a challenging em-
pirical problem. One of the most pervasive issues in the literature is the demarcation of
crises from the non-crisis periods preceding them, and – even more arduous – detection
of the return to normal conditions marking the ‘end’ of a crisis.1 Fry, Hsaio and Tang
(2011) overview the plethora of choices for crisis dates across almost 70 papers.
Crises and contagion effects involve increases in volatility, at both market and indi-
vidual asset level, changes in transmission mechanisms between assets compared with
non-crisis conditions, and are often accompanied by institutional actions to prevent or
mitigate the observed or anticipated impacts of these changes. These three crisis features
are therefore potential indicators to demarcate a crisis period - but they have substantial
drawbacks. For example, changes in transmission mechanisms may also occur simply in
response to market developments, such as new products. Additionally, many papers de-
tect contagion via tests for transmission changes, and thus need an independent means
1See for example the discussion in Jacobs et al. (2005).
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of identifying the relevant periods.2 Institutional intervention is likely to be an imperfect
indicator in most instances. For example, although the ECB interventions on August
9, 2007 are often used to date the beginning of the global financial crisis, it is clear
that this was a response to already heightened anxiety in the markets.3 Since changes
in transmission and institutional interventions present these problems, we are left with
empirical measures, such as heightened volatility, where the primary issue is determining
appropriate thresholds for dating crises.4
This paper develops a method which both endogenously detects a crisis period and
measures the contagion effects within the identified crisis. In order to do this we take
advantage of structural changes that are evident in both the transmission mechanisms and
the volatility of the data over time. We combine smooth transition functions, which enable
us to differentiate crisis and non-crisis periods, with the dynamics of structural shocks
identified through a structural multivariate GARCH model. Effectively, we combine the
advances of smooth transition such as Granger (1993), van Dijk, Tera¨svirta, Frances
(2002), and Silvennoinen and Tera¨svirta (2009) with the GARCH framework of Dungey
et. al (2010). The smooth transition models use logistic functions of time to create convex
combinations of structural parameters through different phases of non-crisis and crisis,
where the matrix of structural linkages between assets is allowed to shift between each
phase. An attractive feature of the smooth transition approach is that these shifts can be
slow or sudden, depending on the slope of the transition function.
As an illustration of the efficacy of the method we apply it to US financial markets
during the period June 17, 2001 to September 16, 2010 for three important asset classes:
2For example, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Dungey and Martin (2007) both impose exogenous dates
while Caporale, Cipollini and Spagnolo (2005) select endogenous break points in a form of a sup-Wald
test based on largest critical values for the significance of contagion detecting dummies.
3Examples of institutional or event based dating is the use of 2 July 1997 - the devaluation of the Thai
bhat - to date the beginning of the East Asian crisis and the move by Malaysia to impose capital controls
at the end of August 1998 as its endpoint; the announcement of delays in Russian bond repayments and
leakage of letters to LTCM clients for the 1998 crises, the collapse of Lehman Brothers to date the second
phase of the 2007-2009 crisis, the NBER trough to date the end of this same crisis.
4Some examples include Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996), Boyson, Stahel, Stulz (2010) and
break point tests such applied by Guidolin and Tam (2010) for spreads.
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property, equities and fixed interest. Specifically we use the FTSE NAREITS index, the
S&P500 index and the Bank of America Merrill Lynch US Treasury index. The smooth
transition component of the framework identifies abrupt transitions from the pre-crisis to
crisis period on October 1, 2007 - following the bailout of Northern Rock in the UK, an
FOMC action to lower US interest rates and a large depreciation of the US dollar against
the Euro. A second phase of the crisis is then identified as occurring from August 20, 2008,
less than one month prior to the formal conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,
the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and bailout of AIG. Finally, we identify a transition
to a further phase from June 18, 2009. This last date coincides with regulatory reform
announcements in the US, and the subsequent NBER dating of the business cycle trough
in this quarter. The dates selected in our data-driven process are consistent with the
event based approach used elsewhere in the literature but by choosing them endogenously
we avoid the potential sensitivity of our results to small changes in exogenously chosen
dates (see, for example, the sensitivity analysis reported in Dungey et al. (2011)).
In the same dataset we also observe significant changes in the transmission linkages
between the different assets during the identified phases. There are dramatic changes in
the influence of REITs shocks, which become much less important during the crisis than
in the pre-crisis period, and we observe a flight-to-quality phenomenon where the usual
linkage between equity and bond index returns becomes insignificant during periods of
stress. The evidence supports the existence of contagion from equity market shocks to
the REITS during both phases of the crisis. Finally, after June 18, 2009, we do not find
that pre-crisis linkages are restored. There remain significant changes in the linkages,
and the transmissions from stock markets to REITs remain higher than in the pre-crisis
period. In the light of subsequent events with the emergence of the Greek and European
sovereign debt crisis from January 2010, it is quite possible that the period from June
to September 2010 should be identified as as a further phase of crisis, rather than a true
post-crisis period. However, our approach clearly marks out the transition and changes
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in linkages which occur across these four distinct phases in recent history, and although
the endogenously determined dates are consistent with an exogenous dating story, they
are neither determined by, nor reliant upon, such a construct.
We begin with an outline of the model in section 1 followed by a discussion of iden-
tification 2. Section 3 describes the estimation and inference from the application of the
model to the financial crisis. In section 4 we conclude and explore possibilities for further
work.
1 The Modelling Framework
Let a k-dimensional vector process Yt with contemporaneous interdependence be described
by the system:
BYt = ut (1)
where the k × k matrix B, with diagonal elements bii normalized to one, determines the
contemporaneous interdependence. Here the conditional mean of Yt (a vector autoregres-
sion) is suppressed for the sake of brevity. Its absence does not affect the consideration of
regime transitions or parameter identification that follow because the parameters in the
conditional mean are all identified as long as B is identified. The entries in the vector ut
are uncorrelated structural innovations
ut = gtet, (2)
where gt is a k × k diagonal matrix and et is a k × 1 vector of i.i.d. standard normal
innovations. In fact gt is the square root of a diagonal GARCH process. This structure
has precedents in the crisis and contagion literature in Dungey et al (2010) and Caporale
et al (2005).
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1.1 Transition, Phases and Contagion
The model in (1) and (2) assumes that contemporaneous linkages, B, are constant. How-
ever, changes to transmission processes, such as are associated with moves from non-crisis
to crisis conditions associated with contagion, may create modifications to B. (See,
among others, Favero and Giavazzi 2002; Forbes and Rigobon 2002; Dungey and Martin
2007; and Pesaran and Pick 2007.) To accommodate regime changes, we augment the
model with smooth transition functions to allow for gradual or rapid switching between
regimes. The parameters of the transition functions determine how the regime changes.
(See, for example, Granger 1993; van Dijk, Tera¨svirta, Frances 2002; and Silvennoinen
and Tera¨svirta 2009.)
Specifically, we formulate the time varying linkages as:
BtYt = ut, (3)
and we allow Bt to be a convex combination of up to N invertible linkage matrices
B0, B1, .., BN , where the diagonals are all normalized to one,
Bt = (1− SN)
[
. . . {(1− S2)[(1− S1)B0 + S1B1] + S2B2} . . .
]
+ SNBN . (4)
The linkage matrices are combined by N logistic transition functions
Sj = (1 + e
−γ(xt−cj))−1, γ > 0, j = 1, . . . , N. (5)
where xt = t/T is the time fraction, and cj is the center of the transition between regimes
j − 1 and j, where 0 < c1 < c2 · · · < cN < 1. If the transition speed γ is high, the model
effectively jumps between regimes. In the first period, for example, while xt remains below
the first time threshold c1, the values of the transition functions Sj for j > 0 are all close to
zero and Bt is made up mostly of the linkage matrix B0. As xt moves beyond c1, the value
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of S1 rapidly approaches one, while S2,..., SN are still close to zero, and Bt effectively
becomes B1. As the time index t increases, xt goes through each of (c1, c2, . . . , cN) and
Bt assumes each of (B0, B1, . . . , BN) accordingly.
An advantage of the smooth transition model over a regime switching model is that
the transition function is continuous and differentiable, and the likelihood is a smooth
function of parameters. For a given number of regimes or phases, when standard regularity
conditions hold, the maximum likelihood estimators are consistent and asymptotically
normal. The asymptotic normality makes inference about cj straightforward.
Contagion is often evidenced by changes in the immediate transmission of shocks
between assets during times of stress. In our framework, changes in the contemporaneous
linkage matrices, (B0, B1, . . . , BN), have a natural interpretation as contagion effects.
Increases or decreases in the strengths of the linkages in different regimes can be tested
by comparing the size of individual (or all) elements of B1, . . . , BN with the pre-crisis
linkages of B0.
1.2 Structural GARCH
A structural GARCH model is used to describe the time-varying volatility of Yt, and is
exploited to identify the structural parameters as in Dungey et al (2010). In particu-
lar, following the structure of (3) we write the conditional distribution of the structural
innovation ut as
BtYt|It−1 ∼ N(0,Gt) (6)
where Gt = gtg
′
t is a k × k diagonal matrix of the squares of the elements of the matrix
gt, and It−1 is the information set available at the end of time period t− 1.
The conditional covariance matrix of the structural shocks is a GARCH(1,1) process
Gt = ΨΨ
′ + λdiag(ut−1)diag(ut−1)′λ′ + ζGt−1ζ ′ (7)
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where Ψ, λ and ζ are k × k diagonal matrices. The typical element in Gt is,
g2i,t = Ψ
2
i + λ
2
iu
2
i,t−1 + ζ
2
i g
2
i,t−1. (8)
When ζ2i +λ
2
i < 1, the unconditional variance is G = var(ut−1) = (Ik−λλ′−ζζ ′)−1ΨΨ′,
and the GARCH parameters (Ψ, λ, ζ) of the structural shocks are assumed to be constant.
1.3 Variance Decomposition
The structural GARCH allows for an alternative approach to identifying and interpret-
ing shocks and avoids arbitrary restrictions such as Choleski decomposition or long-run
variance assumptions. Once the parameters are identified and estimated, the structural
innovations can be isolated, and forecast error variance decompositions can be used to
give an interpretation to the sources of the structural innovations. More specifically, we
treat the shock which contributes the largest part of a forecast error variance during some
base period as emanating from that source. In this way, contagion can be identified not
only by the size of changes to contemporaneous linkages but also attributed to a source;
as in Dungey et al (2010).
The 1-step ahead conditional forecast error variance for Yt is the fitted value of
var[Yt+1|It)] = B−1t+1Gt+1B−1
′
t+1, (9)
using the estimated parameters. SinceB−1t+1 is a function of time and estimated parameters
in Bj, and Gt+1 is a function of the information set up to period t, this variance is known
at the end of period t. It gives a variance decomposition that can be assigned to structural
shocks, where the percentage of the forecast error variance at time t for yi,t+1 that is due
to the structural shock ej,t+1 is
V Di,j,(t+1)|t =
(B−1t+1gj,t+1g
′
j,t+1B
−1′
t+1)ii
(B−1t+1gt+1g
′
t+1B
−1′
t+1)ii
× 100, (10)
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and where gj,t+1 is the jth column of the matrix gt+1. In the results reported below, we
link the structural shock ej,t+1 to the source variable yi,t+1 if V Di,j,(t+1)|t is the largest of
all j.
2 Identification and Estimation
Milunovich and Yang (2010) show that, a sufficient condition for the joint identification
of the mean and variance parameters in a k-dimensional structural VAR-GARCH model
is that no structural shocks are degenerate (i.e. entries in Ψ being zero), and that at
least k− 1 structural shocks have ARCH effects. Their result can be used to analyze our
smooth transition structural VAR-GARCH model as follows.
Proposition 1 If (i) γ is sufficiently large; (ii) no structural shock is degenerate and at
least k−1 structural shocks have ARCH effects; (iii) (B0, B1, ..., BN) are all invertible and
distinct; (iv) 0 < c1 < c2, ..., < cN , then the structural parameters are locally identifiable
at any regular point in the parameter space.
Proof. The reduced form model may be written Yt = B
−1
t ut and Yt|It−1 ∼ N(0,Ht),
where Ht = B
−1
t GtB
−1′
t . Under (i), in Phase i (i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N), the effect on Ht of
Bj for any j 6= i is negligible. Hence, for each i, Bi and structural parameters other than
Bj, with j 6= i, and (c1, c2, . . . , cN) are locally identified in Phase i when (ii) and (iii)
hold (Milunovich and Yang 2010). Hence we only need to establish that the phases are
identifiable. We note that there are only two possible cases to lose identification of the
phases: (a) two or more of (B0, B1, . . . , BN) are identical; (b) two or more of (c1, c2, . . . , cN)
are identical. But these two cases are ruled out by (iii) and (iv). In other words, because
the parameters are at a regular point of the parameter space, where the rank of the
Jacobian from structural parameters to reduced-form parameters does not change locally,
(iii) and (iv) imply that any local changes in (B0, B1, . . . , BN) and (c1, c2, . . . , cN) have
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non-negligible effects on Ht. Therefore the proposition holds under the stated conditions.
We estimate the structural model using maximum likelihood, where the log likelihood
function is given by
LT (θ) = −nk
2
ln(2pi)− 1
2
T∑
t=1
ln(|B−1t GtB−1
′
t |) + (Yt − µt)′B′tG−1t Bt(Yt − µt) (11)
where θ denotes the vector of all parameters, µt = E(Yt|It−1) = α0 +
∑p
j=1AjYt−j
is the conditional mean, which has been suppressed above for the sake of brevity. In
practice, the assumed normality may not be true. Nevertheless, it is well-known that, as
long as the conditional mean and the conditional variance are correctly specified and the
parameters are identified, the quasi ML estimators based on the normal distribution are
consistent (see Gourieroux and Monfort, 1989, p252-253). More specifically, in the context
of time series, given the number of regimes, the quasi ML estimators of the structural
parameters are consistent and asymptotically normal under a set of general regularity
conditions (Bollerslev and Wooldrige, 1992). Among these conditions, the identification
of parameters is crucial, which we establish by Proposition 1.
3 Application to US asset markets: 2001-2010
Investigations of the financial crisis in 2007-2009 often date the beginning of the crisis from
third quarter (August) 2007 in lower frequency analyses, or from August 9, 2007, the date
when the ECB began formal intervention in the markets.5 Many also consider sensitivity
to a start date in September 2008 associated with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, or in
2008 generally as in the overview to the special issue on the crisis in Review of Financial
Studies, 24(6). End points for the crisis are various, generally ranging between the end of
5See, for example, Kalemili-Ozcan, Papaioannou and Perri (2012), Bekaert, Ehrmann, Fratzscher and
Mehl (2011), Mishkin (2011).
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2008 and mid-2009, pointing to reduced volatility by March 2009, or policy changes by
mid-2009. Fry, Hsaio and Tang (2011), Table A4, provide a summary of dating choices for
11 different applications to this period. By applying the method outlined in the previous
section, we will endogenously determine the crisis date points, and demonstrate that these
are broadly consistent with the start points chosen in the existing literature.
We apply the model to the US financial markets for stocks, Treasury bonds and Real
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs). A diversified portfolio might well contain elements of
each of these asset classes. While there is some argument about whether REITs behave
more like equities or real estate, portfolio managers do recommend them as an attractive
component of a portfolio.6 Given that the US financial crisis had origins in the mortgage
markets, and has been associated with a substantial decline in real estate values since 2006,
the inclusion of REITs is expected to illuminate some of the changes in the behavior of
inter asset linkages during the recent crisis period.
We search for up to three endogenously dated regime changes, and four regimes Bj,
over the sample 7 June 2001 - 16 September 2010 using daily returns from the three
asset classes. The values of cj that capture the best break points in the joint structure
determine our crisis break points. Estimation is in one step, by quasi maximum likelihood
in OX and code is available from the authors on request.
Pre-testing using a general model which allowed the slope parameter of the transition
functions, γj, to take arbitrary large values, revealed that the estimated values of γj
exceeded 10,000. That is, the evidence supports a very rapid transition from crisis and
non-crisis phases. For efficiency in the final estimation below, we set the value of γ to
100,000 and estimate the remaining coefficients.
The model specification with three potential break points, to incorporate different
crisis phases is specified as:
[(1− S3){(1− S2)[(1− S1)B0 + S1B1] + S2B2}+ S3B3]Yt = BtYt = ut, (12)
6See, for example,JP Morgan Insights:“The role of REITS in a portfolio”, May 2012
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where Y contains three asset returns, yi for i = 1, 2, 3, and the appropriate value of Bj
is selected by the value the break point indicators cj. When j = 0, the time fraction
transition variable is less than the threshold, so that xt < c1, j = 1 when c1 ≤ xt < c2,
j = 2 when c2 ≤ xt < c3 and j = 3 otherwise. Using time as the transition function
allows us to proxy for the array of concurrent influences that intensify at the beginning
of the crisis and gives a natural interpretation to the thresholds.7
3.1 Data
Daily returns for equities, REITs and Treasury bonds are taken for the S&P500, FTSE
NAREITS and Bank of America Merrill Lynch US Treasury index for the period June 7,
2001 to September 16, 2010. The data in levels are shown in Figure 1. The model of the
previous section is applied with a VAR(4) filter.
Results of formal tests for for linear and non-linear dependence at each stage of the
estimation are set out in Table 6 (Appendix) and support a well-fitting model overall.
While the Hinich (1982) and Jarque-Bera (1980, 1987) tests reject the null of normality,
the Lung-Box Q, Tsay (1986) and Hinich (1982) bispectral tests for no autocorrelation
and linearity in means are not rejected at the 1% level for any ei.
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3.2 Estimated Phase Dates
We estimate three significant break points, with two standard error intervals equivalent
to one week either side of the nominated date (Table 1). The period prior to the first of
these breaks is denoted the pre-crisis phase and runs from the beginning of the sample to
1 October 2007. This break is just after the bailout of Northern Rock by British author-
7Any single financial or economic variable, such as interest rate spreads or measures of market stress
(e.g., VIX) captures only one dimension of crisis conditions. Particular policy interventions, announce-
ments or institutional failures are usually discrete and not suitable to be the continuous measure needed
for transition functions.
8BDS tests (Brock et al. 1996), not reported here, fail to reject pure randomness for all standardized
residuals series.
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ities (13 September), the lowering of the Federal Funds rate by the US Federal Reserve
committee on 18 September and around the time of a large depreciation in the US/Euro
exchange rate. UBS announced a large write-down of its fixed interested portfolios on 1
October, Merrill Lynch reported ‘startling’ losses of $8.4 billion on 5 October, and on 10
October, Treasury Secretary Paulson announced the establishment of the HOPE NOW
alliance to stave off mortgage foreclosures. This dating is slightly later than much of the
existing literature which exogenously dates the start of this phase of the crisis around
August 2007.
The model results indicate that the second phase of the crisis began eleven months
on in late (20th) August 2008. The bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers investment bank
and subsequent rescue of the American Insurance Group in mid September are the most
commonly selected markers for the start of the Global Financial Crisis. However, there
are also earlier indications associated with the emerging problems with Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac from July, culminating in those organizations passing into conservatorship
on 7 September, and while the crisis at Lehman’s hit a low point on 15 September, their
losses were announced earlier in the month.
The dating of the third break point, which marks the transition from the crisis to
some form of post-crisis period is of considerable interest as there are few obvious event
markers. The estimated breakpoint is 18 June 2009, coinciding with the announcement of
financial regulatory reform by President Obama. Other signs of recovery around this time,
include the Federal Reserve beginning to evaluate applications from banks to redeem U.S.
Treasury capital, showing the banks were now able to access long term debt and equity
markets without the support of Federal guarantees. Subsequently, the NBER also dated
the recession trough as occurring in the June quarter.
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3.3 Asset Market Linkages
We assess the evidence for contagion via the changes in linkages between the asset market
returns across the different periods. Note that our GARCH framework takes into account
the changing nature of the volatility of the markets across time, overcoming the criticisms
of spurious contagion results as proposed in Forbes and Rigobon (2002) for example.
Since all markets are in crisis at the same time, we do not distinguish contagious effects
as external or internal to a market, in Dungey et al (2010). Instead we obtain evidence
for the existence and sign of contagion effects between the three markets examined.
The pre-crisis period asset market linkages are all significant, as shown in Table 2. The
first row of the Table shows that positive shocks to stock returns tend to decrease returns
in the Treasury bond index and increase REITs returns. The relationship with REITS
may reflect the unusually bouyant conditions in the housing market prior to the crisis
(Geanakoplos 2009). Shocks to the REITS market returns are also positively correlated
with stock returns pre-crisis, which may reflect the direct effect of housing construction
on expected cash flows and on the strong growth of household consumption funded by
leveraging housing equity (Mian and Sufi 2010).
In the first crisis phase these linkages change dramatically. Shocks emanating from
the T-bond market no longer have a significant effect on other assets; reflecting flight to
quality into T-bonds and the potential role of financial frictions, illiqudity, uncertainty
over the value of collateral and reluctance to realize losses, all of which dampened the
effect of monetary policy (Longstaff 2010; Guidolin and Tam 2010; Hall 2010; and Shleifer
and Vishny 2010). In contrast, the impact of equity shocks on REIT returns increases
almost ten fold in the first crisis phase. Wald tests for parameter differences between the
periods are reported in Table 6 and confirm that this difference is significant.
Contagion effects, in the form of significant changes in the linkages between the dif-
ferent asset classes, are clearly identified in shocks emanating from the equity market
to the REITS in both phases of the crisis, and although the estimated coefficient in the
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second phase of the crisis (0.880) is less than that of the first phase (1.048) this difference
is not statistically significant and does not represent any change in the extent of conta-
gion experienced from this market in the two phases - particularly in comparison with
the significant rise in these linkages from the 0.174 coefficient reported in the pre-crisis
phase. If we take a conventional view that mortgage backed securities and the slowdown
in the property market were triggers for the crisis events, then the increased sensitivity
of the REITS market to equity shocks is consistent with hypersensitivity linkages in the
sense of Dungey et al (2010), where hypersensitivity identifies an increased response of a
market in crisis to events occuring in other markets. The Wald tests show that although
the loadings between other assets change in Table 2 these differences are not statistically
significant, and thus there is little evidence for contagion between other assets. Contagion
between these markets, in this crisis, is limited to links between the REITS and equity
markets.
The results for the post-crisis phase indicate that pre-crisis patterns are not restored.
All Wald tests for parameter equality between the pre- and post-crisis phases reject the
null hypothesis. We still observe stronger linkages between stock and REIT innovations
than during the pre-crisis phase, and insignificant connections between the Treasury bond
and stock market innovations, however T-bond and REIT connections are significant at
the 10% level. The coefficient on REIT innovations in the stock equation at 0.173 is about
half the pre-crisis estimate of 0.314, but the coefficient on shocks from stocks to REITs
is more than 6 times larger, and significantly different.
3.4 Dynamics of structural shocks
Variance decompositions compiled from the estimates in the different phases expose the
changes the transmission patterns from stock, bond and REIT market shocks across the
period. Table 5 reports the average percentage variance due to different sources at each
phase of the crisis. The largest proportion of the variance for each asset return, yi, can
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be attributed to a corresponding shock ei, so we label them as stock, T-bond and REIT
shocks accordingly (see also Dungey et al, 2010, and Diebold and Yilmaz, 2012). In
the pre-crisis period, the average percentage of the forecast error variance attributable
to the own-market shock is close to 80%. The striking changes between the phases are
that during the crisis phases, REITS shocks become more a more important contributor
to stock market returns volatility, as they also do for T-bonds in the first phase of the
crisis, and correspondingly stock market shocks account for a greater proportion of REITS
volatility in the crisis. Strikingly, however, stock market shocks become almost equivalent
to own shocks in the REITS market in the post crisis period, accounting for almost half
of the observed volatility. The portfolio results are most impressive for the reversal of
the importance of REITS and stock shocks in the post crisis period compared with the
pre-crisis; consistent with the important changes between these periods noted earlier.
Figure 2 shows more detail on the time profile of the shocks. It graphs the dynamic
variance decompositions of the one-step-ahead forecast error variances, treating all esti-
mated parameters as known with certainty, for each asset in panels (a) to (c) and for
an equally-weighted portfolio in panel (d). Panels (a) and (d) particularly show that the
REIT-sourced shocks became markedly more important several years before the first crisis
phase, from early 2004. The growth in REIT shocks coincides with the decision of the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development to raise the ‘affordable housing’ goals
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, enabling a large increase in their purchases of securities
backed by subprime loans over the next four years. Turbulence from the stock market
dominates at the beginning and end of the sample. This pattern is mirrored in panel (c)
where the REIT decomposition attributes almost all the forecast error variance to real
estate shocks prior to the crisis. However, during and after the crisis equity shocks became
increasingly important. Bond shocks dominate bond variance decomposition, panel (b),
however a change in the sign of correlation between bonds and stocks in the first phase
of the crisis contributes to a much greater proportion of the bond return variance being
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assigned to stock and REIT shocks than during other phases in the sample.
Overall, the application to the US markets during 2001-2010 have endogeneously de-
termined dates for transition into crisis, between phases of the crisis, and finally into
a post-crisis period. The dates determined for entry into crisis in 2007 are slightly later
than those generally used in the empirical literature - however, as most effects in the early
part of the crisis were felt in UK and European markets, this is not inconsistent given
our focus on US data. The identification of a change to a second phase of crisis in late
August 2008, is earlier than the date of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, but is quite
consistent with growing unease in markets over the uncertainty as to whether Lehman
Brothers would be rescued. The transition to a post-crisis phase in June 2009 accords
with exogeneous dating, but, as with the starting points, has the advantage of being data
determined rather than exogenously imposed. This is particularly important as crisis end
points are notoriously difficult to determine. The method also allows contemporaneous
detection of changes in the transmission of shocks between assets, and in the example we
show evidence of statistically significant contagion effects from equity shocks to REITS
returns during the crisis. Ultimately, in the post crisis period, we demonstrate that the
transmission linkages between the three assets have not returned to their pre crisis values.
4 Conclusion
The Structural GARCH approach with embedded smooth transition functions developed
in this paper allows the modelling of the interlinkages between markets subject to changing
individual and global volatility while simultaneously endogenously identifying the transi-
tion dates between crisis and non-crisis phases. This important innovation means that it
is possible to assess the extent of contagion, due to changes in the transmission linkages
between non-crisis and crisis periods, while also allowing the model to identify the crisis
period from the revealed features of the data. In this way we overcome potentially incor-
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rect assumptions about homogeneity imposed when periods are exogenously demarcated
as non-crisis and crisis, and are also able to assess how well institutional and event based
dating conventions perform against a data driven alternative.
We illustrate the model for contemporaneous linkages between three key US financial
markets; equity, fixed income and real estate, over the period June 7, 2001 to September
16, 2010. We identify four phases during this period - a pre-crisis phase until early October
2007, a first crisis phase until late August 2008, a second crisis phase until June 2009 and
a post-crisis phase from June 2009 to the end of the sample. Pre-testing showed that the
slopes of transition functions are high implying that switches between phases is rapid.
Relative to the event based dates commonly used in the existing literature, our data
driven chronology puts the start of the first phase of the crisis slightly later than events
(which were primarily European) and the start of the second phase as slightly earlier than
the commonly accepted Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy dating convention. The end point
of the crisis concurs with the longest of the existing literature in mid-June.
Estimation of the contemporaneous linkages between financial markets prior to the
onset of the crisis showed coefficients were significantly different from zero and correlated
in conventional ways. However at the onset of the crisis we note that innovations to and
from T-bonds to stocks and real estate trusts became insignificant, and in the first stage
of the crisis, of unexpected sign. Linkages between REITs and equity innovations became
significantly stronger. This pattern persists through the second stage of the crisis and
into the recovery period.
The framework and example developed here enrich our ability to empirically under-
stand the dynamics of financial crises, by allowing the data to reveal both the different
phases in the evolution of moves from non-crisis to crisis and beyond, and the changing
nature of the linkages between assets during those different phases. It reveals that in
some instances the event based markers often used to demarcate crisis periods can both
underestimate and overestimate the date of transition between phases.
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Appendix: Data sources and tests for model fit
• Stocks: S&P500 total returns index, log difference of daily closing values, 6 June
2001 - 16 September 2010; Bloomberg ticker, SPTR.
• Bonds: Bank of America Merrill Lynch Treasury Master, Bond Index, total return,
log difference of daily closing values, 6 June 2001 - 16 September 2010; DataStream
mnemonic MLGTRSA(RI).
• Real estate: FTSE NAREIT composite total returns index, which includes both
price and income returns of all publicly traded real estate investment trusts (eq-
uity, mortgage and hybrid), log difference of daily closing values, 6 June 2001 - 16
September 2010; Bloomberg ticker, FNCOTR.
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Figure 1: Trends in asset prices, June 2001 - September 2010
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Source: Authors calculations, Bloomberg and DataStream. Figure shows levels of daily closing values
for the S&P500 total returns index, FTSE NAREITs total returns index and the Bank of America Merrill
Lynch Treasury Master Bond total returns index.
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Figure 2: Variance decompositions
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Source: Authors calculations. Figure shows percentage of forecast error variance of yi attributable
to structural shock ei i = 1, 2, 3 at each observation.
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Table 1: Time threshold parameter estimates
Date Threshold ∆cj
1 October 2007 c1 0.679
(0.000)
20 August 2008 ∆c2 0.097
(0.000)
18 June 2009 ∆c3 0.089
(0.000)
Note: Parameter estimates for the time thresholds for the crisis phases, cj governed by the smooth
transition functions. All estimated threshold parameters have a standard error of 0.001. P-values are in
brackets.
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Table 2: Parameter Estimation Results: Pre- to Post-crisis linkages
Pre-crisis phase, 7 June 2001- 1 October 2007
TO asset i(yi)
Stocks Bonds REITS
FROM asset j, (yj)
Stocks bi,s -0.169 0.174
(0.000) (0.000)
Bonds bi,b 0.690 -0.289
(0.005) (0.007)
REITS bi,r 0.314 0.086
(0.000) (0.000)
Crisis phase I, 1 October 2007 - 19 August 2008
Stocks bi,s -0.202 1.048
(0.234) (0.014)
Bonds bi,b 0.586 1.006
(0.629) (0.617)
REITS bi,r 0.385 -0.019
(0.004) (0.842)
Crisis phase II, 20 August 2008 - 17 June 2009
Stocks bi,s -0.071 0.880
(0.643) (0.008)
Bonds bi,b -0.264 -1.149
(0.818) (0.377)
REITS bi,r 0.301 0.015
(0.000) (0.794)
Post Crisis Phase, 18 June 2009 - 16 September 2010
Stocks bi,s 0.038 1.259
(0.714) (0.000)
Bonds bi,b -0.585 1.092
(0.381) (0.097)
REITS bi,r 0.173 -0.093
(0.025) (0.049)
Parameter estimates for the model BjYt = ut, j = 0, . . . , 3. P-values are in brackets.
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Table 3: GARCH parameter estimates
Structural Shocks
Stocks Bonds REITS
Constant 0.024 0.003 0.031
(0.004) (0.052) (0.003)
ARCH 0.116 0.066 0.157
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GARCH 0.861 0.898 0.831
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Parameter estimates for the conditional covariance matrix of the structural shocks. Estimation is by
QML over daily filtered returns to equity market indices, sampling 7 June 2001 to 16 September 2010.
P-values are in brackets.
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Table 4: Wald tests for parameter difference between phases.
χ21 p-values
TO Stocks
FROM Bonds b12,t
Crisis I Crisis II Post-crisis
Pre Crisis 0.932 0.419 0.074
Crisis I - 0.610 0.392
Crisis II - - 0.821
FROM REITS b13,t
Crisis I Crisis II Post-crisis
Pre Crisis 0.611 0.832 0.094
Crisis I - 0.555 0.163
Crisis II - - 0.175
TO Bonds
FROM Stocks b21,t
Crisis I Crisis II Post-crisis
Pre Crisis 0.844 0.534 0.062
Crisis I - 0.556 0.224
Crisis II - - 0.588
FROM REITS b23,t
Crisis I Crisis II Post-crisis
Pre Crisis 0.270 0.244 0.000
Crisis I - 0.746 0.479
Crisis II - - 0.172
TO REITS
FROM Stocks b31,t
Crisis I Crisis II Post-crisis
Pre Crisis 0.041 0.033 0.000
Crisis I - 0.742 0.635
Crisis II - - 0.293
FROM Binds b32,t
Crisis I Crisis II Post-crisis
Pre Crisis 0.521 0.510 0.039
Crisis I - 0.379 0.968
Crisis II - - 0.104
Table reports p-values for χ21 statistics for the Wald restriction test of bij,t = bij,t+1 as t = 0, 1, 2.
27
Table 5: Variance decompositions: Average percentage by asset and crisis phase.
Structural shock ei
yi Stocks Bonds REITS
Stocks
Full Sample 78.1 3.6 18.3
Pre Crisis 79.8 3.5 16.7
Crisis Phase I 66.1 7.4 26.4
Crisis Phase II 61.6 2.7 35.7
Post Crisis 89.4 1.5 9.1
Bonds
Full Sample 20.2 74.4 5.5
Pre Crisis 21.0 77.7 1.3
Crisis Phase I 38.2 41.7 20.1
Crisis Phase II 14.1 81.4 4.5
Post Crisis 7.3 76.5 16.2
REITS
Full Sample 12.5 1.2 86.4
Pre Crisis 4.8 0.3 94.9
Crisis Phase I 15.4 7.0 77.6
Crisis Phase II 15.3 2.8 81.9
Post Crisis 46.8 0.4 52.8
Portfolio
Full Sample 35.2 5.3 59.5
Pre Crisis 31.1 5.4 63.4
Crisis Phase I 27.9 12.9 59.3
Crisis Phase II 28.2 2.6 69.2
Post Crisis 65.5 0.8 33.6
Table reports average percentage of forecast error variance of yi in each crisis phase attributable to ej .
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